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1 Introduction
The idea that states should support and protect citizens’ wellbeing goes back at least two
hundred and fifty years; as stated in the 1776 United States Declaration of Independence.1
However in most of the countries around the world common measures for governments’
performances and political objectives still rely mainly on wealth indicators, such as GDP,
GNP.2
More recently, the idea that, to assess how a country is doing, policy makers should
consider not only monetary and financial indicators but also rely on more comprehen-
sive measures of wellbeing has become highly debated among western policy makers and
scholars. Steps in this direction have been taken by the British and French governments
as well as international organizations such as the World Bank, the European Commission,
the United Nations, and the OECD.3
In this paper we investigate whether or not these initiatives taken by governments and
international organizations to come up with indicators of wellbeing to inform policies go in
the same direction as citizens’ expectations on what policy makers should do. Do citizens
really care about their level of ”happiness” when they have to evaluate the performances
of their policy makers? In other words, do citizens reward policy makers for making them
happier by voting for the incumbents?
There is a large literature in political science and economics on retrospective voting,
the proposition that citizens examine whether the state of the world has improved under
a politician’s watch, and vote accordingly. There is a wide consensus that voters eval-
uate diagnostic information such as macroeconomic trends and their personal financial
circumstances to reward good performance while ridding themselves of leaders who are
corrupt, incompetent, or ineffective [e.g., Kramer (1971), Fiorina (1978), (1981); Kinder
1It reads ”We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness”.
2A noticeble exception is Buthan; where, in 1972 the term ”gross national happiness” was coined
and the Centre for Bhutan Studies started developing a sophisticated survey instrument to measure
population’s general level of well-being.
3For example, in 2008 the French government set up a Commission led by Joseph Stiglitz for the
measurement of economic performance and social progress. The aim of the commission was to make
proposals about incorporating the new indicators of economics outputs in national accounts. In the UK,
following the initiative taken by the current Prime Minister David Cameron, the Office for National
Statistics initiated the National Wellbeing Project, culminated with the construction of an ”happiness
index”.
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and Kiewiet (1981); Markus (1988); Lewis-Beck (1988)]. These works primarily look at
the effect of financial and economic outcomes on voting decisions.
Our first contribution to this literature is to augment standard models of voting be-
haviour with measures of wellbeing. Looking directly at individuals’ wellbeing has the
advantage of providing a better and more comprehensive empirical test for the retrospec-
tive voting hypotheses; there are no reasons to limit the analysis to macroeconomics data
or individual financial circumstances. In retrospective voting models, individuals look at
their own utility before considering for which party cast their vote.
There is growing consensus that indexes of subjective wellbeing (SWB) constitute a
reasonably good proxy for utility. These indexes can be understood as an application of
experienced utility that, as discussed in Kahneman and Thaler (1991), is the pleasure
derived from consumption. Rabin (1998) makes the connection between happiness data
and experienced utility explicitly. Recently, Benjamin et al. (2012) go even further
showing that 80% of the times individuals choose the alternatives that maximise their
SWB, which leads to the conclusion that SWB is a good approximation of the modern
concept of Utility.
We construct measures of voting intentions and SWB using the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS), a rich database started in 1991 containing information on over
10,000 British households on yearly basis. We add indicators of wellbeing as additional
explanatory variables to standard empirical model of retrospective voting. We find that
citizens who are satisfied with their life are more likely to cast their vote in favour of the
ruling party. For example, those who declare themselves as highly satisfied are 1.7% more
likely to support the prime minister party in future elections, which goes in addition of
being 1.5 (1.1)% more (less) likely to be pro-incumbent following a perceived improvement
(worsening) of their financial situation.
We identify two possible sources of concern. First, those citizens, whose favorite party
is in power, might become happier just because of the victory of their party, and not
because “good” policies have been implemented, as Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) have
shown. In order to address this source of reverse causality, we split our sample between
partisan and swing voters. Our conjecture is that if an individual does not have any ex
ante party preference (i.e she is a swing voter), the identity of the party in power should
not affect per se the degree of happiness. Also swing voters should be more responsive
to policies than partisan voters because they should switch voting choices entirely in
response to policy choices. The results are consistent with this view, we find that the
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effect of wellbeing on voting for this group is stronger than for the full sample. For
example, being satisfied with life increases the probability of supporting the incumbent
of about 1.9%.
The second source of possible concern is due to the fact that we can show that voters,
who have experienced an increased level of wellbeing, are more likely to support the ruling
party but we are not able to tell which share of this wellbeing is directly imputable to
policy making decisions. The challenge is to understand if citizens are able to make policy
makers accountable only for increased wellbeing that is the direct effect of government’
policies, or rather they are unable to separate the latter from the effect of government-
unrelated outcomes on life satisfaction. There is evidence for that in the literature; Achen
and Bartels (2004) argue that “retrospection is blind” and show that voters are more
likely to oust incumbents following natural disasters, such as shark attacks, floods and
droughts. Wolfer (2009), following this view, measures the extent to which voters in state
gubernatorial elections irrationally attribute credit to the state governor for economic
fluctuations unrelated to their actions. Healy, Malhotra and Hyunjung Mo (2010) explore
the electoral impact of local college football games just before an election and find that
a win in the ten days before Election Day causes the incumbent to receive an additional
1.6 percentage points. But none of these contributions explicitly includes measures of
happiness into their analysis.
Our strategy to address the above point is as follows. First, we find an exogenous shock
of life satisfaction affecting only some respondents (the treated group). Second, we select a
matched sample of individuals who did not experience the shock (matched control group)
but who had the same ex ante probability of experiencing the shock (propensity score
matching). Last, we compare before- and after-the-shock changes in political support
responses of affected individuals to changes in political support responses of unaffected
individuals (difference in difference estimation).
In looking for a shock that has a strong and significant impact on wellbeing and that
is independent from government actions, we think that experiencing widowhood is a good
candidate. Specifically, widowhood (and widowerhood) is largely beyond individuals’ or
government control and is well known to have a deep impact on SWB.4 Clark et (2006),
in particular, using the German Socio Economic Panel Survey show that the death of the
spouse has a strong negative and temporary impact on individuals’ wellbeing and also
4See for example Chipperfield and Havens (2001), Clark and Oswald (2002), Clark (2004), Gardner
and Oswald (2006), Clark et al (2006).
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that women suffer more than men.
There are 268 respondents in the BHPS whose spouse dies between 1992 and 2008,
the period covered by our analysis, 185 are women and 82 men; this is our treated group.
Similar to Clark et al (2006) we find that the 185 women show a larger drop in life
satisfaction following the death of their husband than the 82 men who lost their wife and
that this effect lasts for two years after the loss. We use propensity score to match one to
one the treated respondents with untreated respondents, with similar probability at the
beginning of the period (in 1991) of experiencing widowhood. Using a reduced form DiD
estimation strategy we find that women in the treated group are between 10 and 12% less
likely to be pro-incumbent than individuals in the control group, in the following two years
after the death of their partner. For men, instead, consistently with the less strong effect
of widowhood on wellbeing, we do not find any significant difference in voting intentions
between treated and control group after the event. We take this result as evidence that
voters are not able to make distinction between the source of their wellbeing.
Overall the results seem to indicate quite clearly that life satisfaction measures have
a good explanatory power in predicting voting behavior, they also show that voters are
not able to separate the source/cause of their wellbeing when they decide who to vote for.
We believe that this has quite a strong implication for policy makers, who care about
being re-elected.
Finally this paper adds to a growing literature on happiness and political economy.
Most of the papers in this literature focus on the relationship between voting and wellbe-
ing. For example Flavin and Keane (2012) study the effect of life satisfaction on political
participation while Pacheco and Lange (2010) and Dolan, Metcalfe, and Powdthavee
(2008) look at the reverse causality in this relationship.
An interesting branch of this literature looks at the relationship between partisan-
ship and wellbeing; noticeably MacCulloch, Di Tella and Oswald, (2001), (2003) look at
preferences over inflation and unemployment; Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) show that
left-wing voters’ wellbeing is positively affected by left-wing policy outcomes (like un-
employment) and right-wing voters’ by right-wing policy outcomes (inflation targeting);
while Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) study the effect of the sex of children on party
support.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses
the data, Section 3 introduce the empirical strategy and preliminary results; Section 4
presents the analysis of the effect of widowhood on wellbeing. Discussions and conclusions
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are in the last part of the paper.
2 The Data
The empirical work is based on data from 18 waves of the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS), spanning the period 1991-2008. The BHPS is a rich database collecting infor-
mation on over 10,000 British households on a yearly basis. It contains, beside wellbeing
questions, information on political orientation and participation, voting behavior and in-
tentions, as well as personal information on finances, jobs, family status, education and
region of residence. Note that the same individuals are interviewed every year, which
allow us to exploit the properties of a panel.
Our main variable of interest is a measure for voting intention. We construct this
measure by aggregating the responses from two questions available in the BHPS. First, if
respondents claim not to be close or support any political parties, they are asked “If there
were to be a General Election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be
most likely to support?” Second, if respondents declare to have some political bias, they
are asked to express their party preference. By merging these information together we
construct the variable SupportInc. The variable takes value equal to one if the named
party is the same as the national government party (i.e. Conservative party in the period
1991 to 1997, and the Labour Party from 1997 onwards) and zero otherwise.
Moreover, the fact that questions on party support and closeness are asked allows us
to identify two groups of citizens: we define swing voters, those respondents who do not
support or are close to any particular party (and therefore they are likely to swing their
vote from one party to the other), and partisan voters, those respondents who have strong
ex ante political preferences towards one party. The identification of these two groups will
be discussed in details later in Section 3.2 and will be central for the analysis developed
later in the paper.
Our key explanatory variable to analyse voting intentions is subjective wellbeing. We
use different proxies for it. We derive the main measures of wellbeing from the responses to
the question “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?” This question
is asked to all respondents every year in the BHPS starting from 1996. Respondents have
seven possible categories from among which to choose, these go from #1 (not satisfied at
all), to #7 (completely satisfied).
As a robustness checks we also use the answers to two questions to construct alternative
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measures for wellbeing. The first question is “How is your life satisfaction compared to
the previous year?”There are three possible answers: less then (equal to # 1), same as
(equal to #2), and more than (equal to #3). Like for the life overall satisfaction question
also this started only in 1996. The second question is “Have you recently....been feeling
reasonably happy, all things considered?” Respondents have to assess their degree of
happiness from a scale 1 to 4 (More than usual, same as, less and much less than usual).
Happiness information are available from the first wave of the BHPS.
One important difference between the first and the other two measures of subjective
wellbeing is that the former is measured on an absolute scale, whereas the latters re-
quire that the respondent assesses her own life satisfaction on a intertermporal basis, by
comparing her present wellbeing with the one attained in the immediate past.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of life satisfaction across British individuals interviewed
between 1996 and 2008. The unconditional mean for life satisfaction reported over these
years is 5.2, with a median of 5. Table 1 shows the mean of life satisfaction during the
different legislatures covered by the period 1996-2008, conditional on the respondents’
political ideology. These statistics lead to some preliminary observations: swing voters
report, on average, a lower life satisfaction than partisan voters (independently on their
political orientation), and labour partisan voters report, on average, a lower life satisfac-
tion than conservative partisan voters. Both observations suggest there could be reverse
causality between the (strong) political ideology and life satisfaction, which provides valid
support to our strategy of conducting the baseline analysis on the split sample of swing
voters only.
As mentioned earlier, the literature on retrospective voting has recognised the impor-
tance of monetary and financial indicators to determine voting choices. Following Fiorina
(1979) and many others we use a subjective indicator to account for them, which we
derive from the responses to the question “How is your financial situation compared to
last year?” There are three possible answers respondent can choose from: the financial
situation is better, same as and worse compared to last year. Taking these answers we
construct the dichotomous variables BetterF in and WorseF in taking values of one if the
respondents believe that their financial situation is respectively better and worse than last
year and zero otherwise. We also compute respondents family income following the stan-
dard procedure of dividing the family income by the number of family members squared.
Finally we account for a set of controls which are usually included in the literature of
wellbeing and voting behaviour. These are: age of respondents (linear and squared), sex,
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marital status, income. Summary statistics for these controls are displayed in Table 2.
3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy is based on assessing the main assumptions of retrospective voting
models using wellbeing measures rather than monetary and financial ones. This class of
models assumes that voting decisions are based on utility comparison between different
periods. The main idea is that if utility levels have increased overtime voters are more
likely to cast their vote in favour of the incumbent. Previous research testing retrospective
voting models have used exclusively monetary and financial indicators to proxy for utility.
Our hypothesis is that wellbeing indicators constitute a better and more comprehensive
proxy for utility, which take into account all those factors which are not measurable
in monetary terms. There is growing consensus on the fact that indexes of subjective
wellbeing (SWB) constitute a reasonably good proxy for utility, see for example Kahneman
and Thaler (1991), Benjamin et al. (2012). So our first goal is to test the validity
of retrospective voting models replacing financial and monetary measures with our life
satisfaction measures to proxy for utility.
We proceed as follows. We first start by replicating the main estimations employed in
previous research, to investigate whether voting decisions depend on evaluation of financial
situation. In particular, following Fiorina (1979), which uses subjective questionnaire
responses to show that voters are more (less) likely to cast their votes for the incumbent
if they believe that their financial situation has improved (got worse) compared to the
past, we first estimate our traditional model (Model 1):
SupportIncit = 1[β1BetterF init + β2WorseF init + γXit + ηt + ai + εit > 0] (1)
where SupportIncit is our proxy for voting intention described in the previous section,
BetterF init and WorseF init are two dummy variables taking values of 1 if the respondent
has replied that her financial situation is respectively better or worse than in the past,
aiming to capture variations in utility due to monetary/financial components; Xit is a
vector if individuals’ personal characteristics (age, sex, income, marital status etc.), ηt is
a year effects, ai is an individual effect (either random or fixed) and εit is the error term.
The coefficients of interests are β1 and β2. Trivially β1 is expected to be positive and β2
negative.
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Next, we replace BetterF init and WorseF init with our wellbeing measures to account
for the non-financial component of individuals’ utility. So we estimate the wellbeing model
(Model 2):
SupportIncit = 1[δWellbeingit + γXit + ηt + ai + εit > 0] (2)
Where WellBeing is constructed from respondents’ answers on life satisfaction and
happiness. The coefficient of interest is now δ, which is expected to be positive. Finally,
we combine equations (1) and (2), to estimate a general model (Model 3) where both
wellbeing and financial indicators are included as regressors:
SupportIncit = 1[δ
′Wellbeingit+β′1BetterF init+β
′
2WorseF init+γXit+ηt+ai+εit] (3)
We start off by estimating equations (1), (2) and (3) as linear probability model (LPM)
with and without fixed effects (FE), so to control for the effect of a within variation in
life satisfaction over the voting behaviour. However, since SupportIncit is a dichotomous
variable, we also propose an alternative specification where we employ both pooled and
RE Probit model, for the conditional distribution of the probability that the respondent
supports the incumbent party. To allow for correlation between the model’s covariates
and the unobserved heterogeneity, ai, we follow Chamberlain (1980), and assume the
latter follows a normal distribution with linear expectation and constant variance. So we
augment our model with a series of individual specific observable characteristics.5
3.1 Preliminary Results: the Full Sample
Results are displayed in Table 3 and 4. Both tables have the same format. In the first one
we present the result for the LPM (without and with FE), in the second one those for the
Probit model (without and with RE). In the first two columns we report the estimated
coefficients for model (1), the traditional retrospective voting model. In columns 3 to 6
of both Tables we display results for model (2), the wellbeing model. The tables use two
variations of Wellbeingit. First we construct a dummy variable taking the value equal
5The vector of individual characteristics includes information such as whether the respondent reg-
ularly reads newspapers, wehther she ever smoked over the years, whether her partner has ever been
out of employment, and what is the average income of her household. By adding these variables, the
Chamberlain’s RE Probit essentially estimates the effect of varying the model’s covariates while holding
these individual’s specific characteroistics fixed.
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to one if the respondent has chosen the answer #5, #6 or #7 to the question on life
satisfaction and zero otherwise, this indicates that the respondent is highly satisfied with
life. Second we treat the answers (from #1 to #7) to the question on life satisfaction
as a continuous variable. Finally, in the last two columns we propose the results of the
full model, where both wellbeing measures and financial indicators are included, as in
equation (3). All the regressions include the same set of controls, i.e. marital status,
sex, age and age squared, along with the logarithm of family income, a set of region
of residence-dummies and a set of wave-dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
There are just over 4,200 individuals, who were interviewed for the all period and for
which we have information on wellbeing and voting intentions. The dataset is made up
of over 55,000 observations.
Starting from the results on the traditional model, both the LPM (Table 3) and Probit
model (Table 4) estimates are in line with the basic hypothesis on the retrospective voting
model, according to which one’s financial situation matters for voting decisions. All the
relevant coefficients are highly significant, at lest at 5% level. In particular respondents
who believe that their financial situation has improved compared to the previous year are
more likely to support the incumbent compared to those whose financial situation has
not changed, the estimated coefficients suggest that, approximately, the magnitude of the
effect is an increase in the likelihood of supporting the incumbent of between 1.4 (in the
pooled regression) and 1.6% . Respondents who are instead worse off compared to the
previous year appear to punish the incumbent by reducing the likelihood of granting their
support by approximately 1.8%.
Moving to the wellbeing model, where measures of subjective financial performances
are substitute with life satisfaction indicators, we can see that all the estimated coefficients
of interest are highly significant in all our specifications, using both variations of wellbeing
measures. The magnitude of the response is similar to those recorded for the previous
model, if a respondent is very satisfied with life she will be about 2% more likely to
support the incumbent than if not. Similarly using life satisfaction as continuous variable,
an increase of one percentage point in life satisfaction is associated with an increase of
about half percentage points in the likelihood to be pro-incumbent.
In the final model we include both indicators of wellbeing and of subjective financial
position. We find that both indicators remain with the same sign and magnitude as in
the previous set of regressions and they do not loose significance, which indicates that the
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two measures do not capture the same thing. Finally, as a robustness check, we run our
baseline models using alternative measure of subjective wellbeing.
In summary, our results support the idea that citizens’ wellbeing matters for voting
decisions, and in particular our findings suggest that measuring utility in terms only
of monetary and financial indicators leaves out an important component, which has a
significant impact on voting decisions. In Table 12 (in the Appendix) , as a robustness
checks, we report the results for the estimation of model (1), (2) and (3) using alternative
wellbeing indicators. The coefficients of interest are overall similar to those presented here
even if their significance is generally lower.
However, the role of ideology and the possibility of reverse causality between SupportInc
and Wellbeing needs to be addressed. As for the results presented in Table 3 and 4, we
cannot rule out a possible positive effect on wellbeing triggered by the victory of the
preferred party, and therefore we could misleadingly interpret our results. In the next
section we address this.
3.2 Further Results: Swing Voters Only
Broadly speaking, ideological preferences towards one party (party bias) are modelled in
the literature on (retrospective) voting as given parameters, heterogeneously distributed
within the population. In particular, some citizens are assumed to have strong partisan
preferences (either towards the incumbent or the challenger) while others to be more ide-
ologically neutral (i.e. they do not care about party identity). In this setting, voting
decisions become the outcomes stemming from two different components, the “ideologi-
cal” one coming from party bias and the “policy” one coming from government’s choices.
Partisan citizens will cast their vote on both grounds (ideological and policy related), and
the weights on each component will depend on the intensity of their party bias. Ideolog-
ically neutral voters instead will swing their vote exclusively in response to government
policies.
Our strategy to reduce the possible bias due to the influence of political ideology on self
reported wellbeing is to isolate voters according to their political allignment and analyse
the voting behavior of a more ideologically neutral group, that of the swing voters. Since
these type of respondents do not have any ex ante party preferences, they choose who to
vote exclusively by evaluating government policies. Therefore for this group it can only
be that increased utility (i.e. wellbeing ) causes SupportInc and not vice versa.
Luckly, two questions asked in the BHPS allow us to split the sample between partisan
11
and swing voters. The survey questions used to this purpose are: (i) “Do you support any
political party”? and (ii) “Are you close to any political party?” If respondents answer
“No” to both we classify them as a swing voters. The subsample of swing voters is made
up of about 2,800 individuals, about three quarter of the full sample. We then re-estimate
equations (1), (2) and (3) using this subsample. The results are reported in Table 5 and
6, which have the same format as, respectively, Table 3 and 4, and use the same set of
controls.
Broadly speaking the results are in line with the one presented in the previous sec-
tions, most of the coefficients remain highly significant. There are two main changes to
note. First the coefficients of wellbeing measures are still very significant and, generally,
higher in magnitude than those presented in Table 3 and 4; for example looking at our
preferred estimation, the RE-Probit in the last column, the coefficient for Wellbeing is
now 0.099 compared with 0.080 in the correspondent column of Table 3 and 4. Second,
the indicators of individual economic performance became instead much less significant.
For example, the positive effect of improved financial situation becomes non significant
in all specifications except from under specification (1) and using the FE-LPM. Similarly,
the significance of the negative effect on worse financial situation is almost always wiped
out of its significance, apart from under specification (1) and pooled models.
As a robustness check, we re-estimate our preferred model on both the full sample and
the restricted subsample of swing voters, while using alternative measures of subjective
wellbeing. Table 7 reports all our additional results. First, we use life satisfaction as a
categorical variable (columns [a] and [d]), then we substitute it with a variable (ghql)
informing about an intertemporal comparison of the respondent’s happiness (columns [b]
and [e]), to finally conclude with a second categorical measure of subjective wellbeing,
where evaluation of one’s happiness is measured on a scale of four levels (column [f] and
[c]). Observations on this last variable were collected since the beginning of the BHPS.
So overall, the emerging picture is that, when taking out the ideological component
from voting intentions, it seems that using wellbeing measures generates more consistent
and significant results. We interpret this as an indication that using wellbeing indicators
to proxy for utility is more appropriate than using only monetary of financial proxies.
However there is still an important link in the relationship between policy choices,
wellbeing and voting that need to be address: the possibility that citizens are not able
distinguish if wellbeing/utility is a consequence of policy makers’ policy choices or it is
determined by government-unrelated events. We address this in the next section.
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4 Exogenous shocks of (un)happiness
In the previous section we have established that those voters whose level of wellbeing is (or
become) higher are more likely to support the incumbent. But is this increased wellbeing
the results of government’s actions? In the first part of the paper we have shown that using
wellbeing indicators to proxy for utility is better than using only financial or economic
subjective measures. However we still have to understand if voters can distinguish between
sources of wellbeing when they make their voting decisions. Wellbeing indicators have
indeed the nice characteristics to be more comprehensive than standard proxies for utility,
but they are affected by different events, some of which are beyond governments control.
In this section we address this problem: can citizens/voters understand whether their
increased life satisfaction, and more broadly wellbeing, is a consequence of some enacted
policy? and if so, would they be more likely to vote for the incumbent also following
improvements in their life satisfaction that are clearly unrelated to government’s actions?
Our strategy to address this is, first, to find an exogenous - not dependent on gov-
ernment’s policies- shock of life satisfaction affecting only some respondents, our treated
group. Second to select a matched sample of individuals who did not experience the shock
(matched control group), but who have the same ex ante probability of experiencing the
shock (propensity score matching). Last, to compare before-and after- shock changes in
political support responses of affected individuals to changes in political support responses
of unaffected individuals (difference in difference estimation).
The kind of shock that allows us to proceed (i) has to have a strong and significant
impact on wellbeing and, (ii) has to be independent from government actions. Clark et
al. (2006), analyses different shocks of un/happiness using the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP). These are: marriage, birth of a child, unemployment, outlays and wid-
owhood. Some of these shocks have little or no effect on wellbeing, like birth of a child and
marriage. Other may be the outcomes from policy choices, and therefore not exogenous,
like unemployment and outlays. One that is just right for our purposes is widowhood
(widowerhood).
This event, largely beyond individuals’ or government control, is well known to have
a deep impact on wellbeing (see for example Phlbad and Adamic (1972), Stevens (1995),
Chipperfield and Havens (2000), Clark and Oswald (2002), Clark (2005), Gardner and
Oswald (2006), Clark et al (2006)). Also, according to Clark et al. (2008) in their
widely cited paper on the leads and lags of shocks of life satisfaction, the spouse death
has a strong negative temporary impact on individuals’ wellbeing and also a significantly
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stronger effect on women than men.
4.1 Propensity Score Matching
In order to be able to analyse the response to negative shocks of life satisfaction, such
as those caused by an event like widohwood, we encounter two problems. First a direct
comparison between treated and untreated individuals is biased by the fact that differ-
ences across these two groups depend on selection. Second, the time of the treatment
is respondent specific and cannot be imputed for the members of the non-treated group.
Propensity score matching provides a solution to both problems. It consists in relying on
a set of observables that affect the “probability of being treated” (propensity score), in
an attempt to reproduce the treatment group among the non-treated. Imputation of the
time of treatment to the members of the control group is therefore made by pairing each
of its individuals to a member of the treated group. Becker and Hvide (2013) use a similar
approach to match firms with deceased entrepreuner with firms where the organization
never experienced a similar shock.
We use nearest neighbour mathcing to select the group of individuals whose proba-
bility of experiencing widowhood (or widowerhood) between 1992 and 2008 (the whole
length of the BHPS), conditional on characteristics observed in 1991, is the closest to that
of the 287 individuals who did experience widowhood over the same period.6 We start
from estimating the propensity score by running a probit for the likelihood of becoming
widow. Table 8 provides evidence of the good explanatory power of the chosen covariates,
given the significance of their coefficients and the high pseudo − R2 of 0.32.7 The pre-
dicted probabilities from this model constitute our propensity scores. Before matching,
the average propensity score is 0.3428 for the treated group , and only 0.0621 for the
non-treated group. After imposing a radius of 0.01 for the identification of the nearest
neighbour to any individual belonging to the control group, we discard 58 individuals and
remain with a sample of 229 respondents (127 of these are women and 82 men) who did
experience widowhood and 229 matched respondents who didn’t. In the matched sample,
the average propensity score is reduced to 0.2566 for the treated group and 0.2578 for
6This procedure involved omitting from the sample the individuals who had never been married, those
who were always reported as widows, and those who re-married after widowhood.
7We also estimated this model with a larger set of variables controlling for a full set of personal,
health-related and financial characteristics. Other explanatory variables not included in this preferred
specification resulted as consistently insignificant in all other robustness checks.
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the control group. Figure 2 provides histograms for the estimated propensity score before
and after matching.
Table 9 reports statistics for the reduction in bias attained through the matching
procedure: it reports test of equality in the means of all used covariates across the Treated
and Control group, both before and after matching. The results from the last column
suggest that, for all covariates, we fail to reject the null of mean equality after the matching
procedure is concluded. Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the same bias
reduction.
4.2 Difference-in-differences setup
Here we are interested in whether a negative shock of wellbeing, independent on gov-
ernment’s policies, can affect voting behavior. In the Appendix we produce formal and
graphical analysis that show that, consistently with previous research, the shock in life
satisfaction is significant only for women and its duration if of two years after the death.
To address this problem we want to understand whether individuals experiencing this
shock change their voting intention in response to the shock compared to individuals
whose spouse does not die. If this is the case, we take this as evidence that voters are not
able to distinguish between government -related and unrelated events when they decide
their voting strategy. We are mainly interested in the differences after the event (the
death), but we also look into the behavior before the death. As we will show there is no
different behavior before the death which is consistent with the fact that the matching
procedure has effectively worked by selecting individuals who do not have pre-treatment
differences, even if the death is preceded by long period of illness.
Our main focus is now to understand whether the spouse death affects voting behavior.
There are two main reasons why we do not perform standard OLS. The first is that control
and treated group are not necessarily comparableex ante, see for example Becker and
Hvide (2013) for a detailed explanation on this point. The second, and most important
reason, is that the spouse death does not occur for every individuals in the same year (see
Table 12 in the Appendix), so matching is a way of finding comparable controls who at the
beginning of the period, i.e. in 1991, had the same probability of loosing husband or wife.
We then use year of spouse death of treated respondents to impute the counterfactual
year of spouse death of the matched control. So, we are able to define before and after
spouse death for both treated respondents and matched controls.
We start by looking at the basic difference in differences regression, where we compare
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treated and matched controls to assess how voting intentions are affected by the spouse
death (treatment).
SupportIncit = α+λ1×treatedi+λ2×afterit×treatedi+λ3×afterit+γ×Xit+δt+uit (4)
The coefficient of interest is λ2, which measures the difference between treated respon-
dents and control respondents after the treatment. The coefficient λ1 also presents some
interest because it constitutes a test for the lack of pre-treatment effect. We include all
the controls that have been previously included in the regressions; these are age (in linear
and squared form), logarithm of family income, sex as well as year and region dummies.
Standard errors are cluster at individuals level. We estimate equation (4) using LPM.
Equation (4) is also extended several directions to include some of the shock’s charac-
teristics that are formally reported in the Appendix. First, since the shock turned out to
be significant only for women, we look at the responses of men and women separately. We
do it in two ways: (i) by interacting afterit× treatedi by sex of the respondent dummies;
(ii) by running separate regressions for male and female respondents. Second, since the
shock of wellbeing lasts for only two years after the death, we look if treated respondents
differs from the control group only in the same period of the shock. To address this we
estimate separately the effect on the year of the death, and 1, 2, 3 and 4 years after,
So if the we find that the effect on the probability of supporting the incumbent in
the treated group last for the same period as the shock of life satisfaction and the effect
on women is stronger than in men, we can attribute quite confidently the effect of the
treatment on voting intention to the shock of unhappiness.
4.3 Difference-in-differences results
Estimation results for equation (4) and its variations are displayed in Tables 10, 11A
and 11B. In most of our regressions we consider windows of three years after and before
the spouse death, but we also experiment with shorter and longer periods. To note that
we have shown in Section 4.2 that there are no differences between control and treated
group at the beginning of the period. When we estimate (4) we also carry out tests
that the two groups remain comparable in the periods before the treatment, to make sure
that there are no pre-treatment differences between the two groups. The coefficients λ1
presented in the first row of Tables 10, 11A and 11B show that this is indeed the case. To
provide further evidence we interact the pre treatment period with pre-treatment years
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before {1,2, 1-2} dummies . The results displayed in the tables are again consistent with
the assumption that there is no pre-treatment effect.
We start the discussion of our results with Table 10. The first six columns of the table
present the results for λ2 when the data are restricted to 4, 3 and 2 years after and before
the treatment. In columns 1, 3 and 5 we impose the restriction that men and women react
in the same way to their loss. From the inspection of the table we can observe that overall
there is a weak negative effect of widowhood on the probability of incumbent support, but
this effect becomes significant only when restricting the sample to the two year window.
In columns 2, 4 and 6 we relax the restriction of homogeneous treatment effect by sex and
we estimate different coefficients for men and women in the treated group. Consistently
with the asymmetric shock of happiness that hits the two sexes differently, the results
show clearly that women are the ones who changes their voting behavior following the
spouse death, the λ2 are negative and become significant when we restrict the sample to
the two or three years from the treatment.
In columns 7 and 8, we try to get more precise estimates of the effect’s duration, by
estimating different coefficients for {0,1,2} years after and before and {3} years after.
Again, we first start by estimating a common λ2 for men and women and then one for
each sex. The results suggest that women are 10% less likely to vote for the incumbent in
the following two years after their husband death, there is no significant effect for men.
Finally in the last four columns we estimate the effect of widowhood in each single year
after and before the treatment. Again we obtain significant and negative coefficients for
women in the year of the event (-8.8%) and in the following year (-13%) and insignificant
one for men.
As a robustness checks, we run separate regressions for men and women. The results
are displayed in Tables 11A and 11B . From the inspection of the tables, we can clearly
see that all the previous results are confirmed both in term of magnitude and significance.
One possible concern is how to guarantee that the revealed negative treatment effect
in women is due to the happiness shock rather than to a switch towards the Labour
party (who was in power in the second period of our dataset). Alimenting this concern,
there is the observation that the Labour party political agenda is well known to be more
benevolent to (poorer) pensioners than the Conservative, so widows effectively loose also
the current and future earnings of their late husband, which represents a clear economic
reasons why the same person should move her party preferences towards the Labour party.
Our argument, in the contest of this paper, is that if the loss of a partner was perceived
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mainly in economic terms (i.e. as the loss of a portiong of the household’s income), then
we should observe a permanent negative effect, instead of the temporary effect reported
in our data, where widowhood affects voting behavior only for one, maximum two years
after the shock.
Another possible concern could be that, if the death of the spouse follows a long
illness and/or hospital care, the drop in the support for the incumbent could be due
to the (negative) evaluation of the National Health Service. However, we can rule out
this because control and treated group are matched in a way that individuals in the two
groups experience the same exposure to the national health care system (NHS in the
UK), and the correctness of the matching procedure has been validated by the absence of
pre-treatment effects, as we have shown.
5 Conclusion
Motivated by recent initiatives taken by governments and international organisations to
come up with measures of wellbeing to inform policies to integrate standard monetary
and financial measures, we test if wellbeing data can be used to predict voting behavior.
Our aim was to contribute to the empirical literature on retrospective voting by aug-
menting standard models of voting behavior with measure of wellbeing to proxy for utility.
Preliminary results suggest that wellbeing data are good proxies for utility and in partic-
ular that voters changes their voting intentions in response to changes in their level of life
satisfaction.
There are two main sources of concern we address in the paper. The first one is the
possible reverse causality between voting and wellbeing when political ideology enter into
the equation. For example, a strong Conservative supporter may be happy when the
Tories are in power and not because of specific policy choices implemented by the party.
To address this we split the sample between partisan and ideologically neutral voters, and
we look at the behavior of the latter group. This exercise confirms our previous results,
that being high satisfied with life increases the probability of supporting the ruling party
of about 1.9 percentage points.
Once established that wellbeing measures are good indicators for predicting voters’ be-
havior, we proceeded in the direction of asking whether or not voters are able to correctly
reward or punish the incumbent government only for the variation in life satisfaction that
is directly imputable to government actions. People’ happiness may indeed depend on
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several factors and many of them are not directly imputable to government’s action. To
address this we test whether or not an exogenous shock of happiness affects voter’s pref-
erence toward the incumbent. We use difference in difference estimation and propensity
score matching to identify the effect that widowhood (the exogenous shock) has on the
probability of supporting the incumbent party. We find that women who loose their hus-
band are, in the following two years from the death, between 10 and 12% less likely to
be pro-incumbent than (similar) individuals who do not. For men, instead, consistently
with the less strong effect of widowhood on wellbeing, we do not find any significant dif-
ference in voting intentions between treated and control group after the event. We take
this result as evidence that voters are not able to make distinction between the source of
their wellbeing.
We believe that our results bring some interesting implications. First of all, they
motivate the efforts taken by governments and international organizations in producing
better and more comprehensive measures for wellbeing, since they appear to have good
explanatory power to predict voters’ intentions, which is consistent with retrospective
voting models. Second, they highlight citizens’ inability to correctly blame or reward
policy makers only for the actions they are responsible for. Taking this result to an
extreme, given happy pills before elections to every citizen would certainly increase the
re-election chances of the incumbent. Why are elections always held in May (in the UK),
when the sun shine high and makes everybody happy?
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Figure 1: Distribution of Life Satisfaction Levels among British People
Table 1: Life Satisfaction, conditional on Political Ideology
Labour Partisan Swing Voter Conservative Partisan
Legislature Strong Medium Weak - Weak Medium Strong
Conservative 1992 5.111 5.135 5.172 5.201 5.420 5.467 5.638
(1.558) (1.435) (1.306) (1.337) (1.147) (1.307) (1.435)
Labour 1997 5.176 5.223 5.186 5.182 5.371 5.448 5.433
(1.582) (1.362) (1.296) (1.320) (1.182) (1.284) (1.491)
Labour 2001 5.474 5.299 5.202 5.190 5.367 5.464 5.497
(1.421) (1.323) (1.269) (1.316) (1.151) (1.201) (1.339)
Labour 2005 5.418 5.263 5.196 5.166 5.348 5.326 5.450
(1.438) (1.274) (1.217) (1.282) (1.102) (1.222) (1.279)
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for main Covariates
Variable Obs Resp. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Support Incumbent 67189 3773 0.373 0.484 0 1
Life Satisfaction 49987 2868 5.249 1.223 1 7
Happiness 74004 4160 2.026 0.558 1 4
Swing Voter 75051 4215 0.327 0.469 0 1
Partisan Voter 75051 4215 0.673 0.469 0 1
Conservative Supporter 74032 4154 0.286 0.452 0 1
Labour Supporter 74032 4154 0.352 0.477 0 1
Married 75857 4259 0.668 0.471 0 1
Widow 55383 3087 0.085 0.279 0 1
Income (in th. $) 75857 4259 20.389 16.109 0.108 86.612
Female 75857 4259 0.558 0.497 0 1
Age 75857 4259 48.411 15.572 15 97
Fiancial Situation Compared to last year: Better 75857 4259 0.242 0.428 0 1
Fiancial Situation Compared to last year: Worse 75857 4259 0.253 0.435 0 1
Note: data used for these descriptive statistics include the balanced sample of all individuals observed
consecutively for all years between 1996 and 2008. Respondents dropped from the sample also include those
who were below the age of 16 in 1991, those who never got married over the full length of the dataset, those
who were always recorded as widow from the beginning of the dataset and those who experienced widowhood
but then re-married in a subsequent year. The sample also excludes individuals in the top percentile of the
income distribution and of the age distribution.
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Table 8: Propensity Score Estimation
Dependent Variable: equal 1 if ever been widowed
between 1992 and 2008
Probit
Age in 1991 0.0464***
(.004)
Female 0.5393***
(.087)
In Working Age in 1991 -0.4127***
(.141)
Spouse Employed in 1991 -0.2751***
(.098)
ln (Household Income) in 1991 -0.1788***
(.067)
Dummy: 1 if visited GP more than twice
in 1991
-0.2250***
(.087)
Dummy: 1 if uses alternative medicine
0.0349
(.199)
Dummy: 1 if Checked Cholesterole in 1991
-0.2013*
(.115)
Constant -1.2518
(.762)
No. Respondents 4,125
Log-Likelihood -665.458
Pseudo R-squared 0.3208
Note: Probit Model for the likelihood of experiencing widowhood,
conditional on personal characteristics observed in 1991. Sample:
4,125 respondents from the balanced sample of BHPS, as observed
in 1991. All specifications also include region of residence and
household type dummies. Standard Errors are reported in paren-
thesis.
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Figure 2: Histogram of Propensity Score, conditional on Treatment Status
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Table 9: Balancing Across Covariates used in the Propensity Score Estimation
Variable (as observed in 1991)
Bias Mean
Test for
Equality of
Means
Sample Treated Control %
% Re-
duced
t-test p > t
Age of Respondent Unmatched 56.472 37.770 141.4 98.8 23.120 0.000
Matched 53.341 53.563 -1.7 -0.190 0.851
Female Unmatched 0.726 0.541 38.9 97.6 6.050 0.000
Matched 0.681 0.686 -0.9 -0.100 0.920
In Working Age Unmatched 0.549 0.960 -108.6 96.8 -28.070 0.000
Matched 0.690 0.677 3.5 0.300 0.764
Dummy: 1 if smoke Unmatched 0.243 0.262 -4.3 -17.9 -0.690 0.493
Matched 0.249 0.227 5.0 0.550 0.584
Dummy: 1 if Permanent Job Unmatched 0.389 0.689 -63.1 95.6 -10.470 0.000
Matched 0.476 0.463 2.8 0.280 0.779
Dummy: 1 if full time emplyed Unmatched 0.285 0.570 -60.3 80.1 -9.430 0.000
Matched 0.358 0.301 12.0 1.290 0.197
Dummy: 1 if retired Unmatched 0.365 0.043 87.1 95.9 21.810 0.000
Matched 0.262 0.249 3.5 0.320 0.749
Dummy: 1 if full spouse em-
ployed
Unmatched 0.330 0.604 -57.0 92.0 -9.110 0.000
Matched 0.410 0.432 -4.5 -0.470 0.637
ln(Household Yearly Income) Unmatched 9.453 9.910 -67.4 96.8 -11.360 0.000
Matched 9.565 9.580 -2.1 -0.220 0.826
Respond. in good health Unmatched 0.753 0.795 -9.9 89.4 -1.650 0.099
Matched 0.760 0.755 1.0 0.110 0.913
Dummy: respondent visits
GP at least twice a year
Unmatched 0.708 0.741 -7.4 73.6 -1.220 0.223
Matched 0.703 0.712 -2.0 -0.200 0.838
Dummy: respondent ever
hospitalized
Unmatched 0.090 0.105 -4.9 -142.3 -0.770 0.443
Matched 0.105 0.070 11.8 1.320 0.186
Dummy: respondent uses al-
ternative medicine
Unmatched 0.035 0.038 -1.5 -56.7 -0.240 0.811
Matched 0.035 0.031 2.3 0.260 0.793
Respondent did blood test Unmatched 0.563 0.509 10.7 1.8 1.730 0.083
Matched 0.559 0.507 10.5 1.120 0.262
Respondent did x-ray checkup Unmatched 0.160 0.133 7.5 -80.2 1.260 0.206
Matched 0.162 0.114 13.6 1.490 0.136
Respondent did cholesterol
checkup
Unmatched 0.101 0.126 -8.0 -4.0 -1.240 0.214
Matched 0.122 0.148 -8.3 -0.820 0.414
Female Respondent did
breast cancer test
Unmatched 0.285 0.249 8.2 63.8 1.350 0.176
Matched 0.306 0.293 3.0 0.310 0.760
The table reports the mean of the covariates relevant to the Propensity Score Estimation across
the Treated and Control group for both the matched and unmatched samples. It also reports
indication of the bias across the Treated and Control group and the reduction in bias attained
through the matching procedure. Finally,it shows the results for a test of equality in the means of
these covariates across the Treated and Control group both before and after the matching.
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Figure 3: Covariates Imbalance before and after Matching
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Table 10: Results from Difference in Difference Estimates on full matched sample
Dep. Variable:
Supp. Incumb.
(1)a (2)a (3)b (4)b (5)c (6)c (7)b (8)b (9)b (10)b (11)b (12)b
Treated 0.017 0.015 0.034 0.033 0.046 0.045 0.041 0.040 0.034 0.033 0.042 0.040
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045)
After*TRTD*F -0.054 -0.083* -0.107***
(0.045) (0.043) (0.040)
After*TRTD*M 0.075 0.056 0.048
(0.059) (0.057) (0.056)
After*TRTD -0.013 -0.039 -0.058*
(0.040) (0.037) (0.034)
TRTD*(3,4,5)
yrs after
-0.021
(0.055)
TRTD*(0,1,2)
yrs after*F
-0.053
(0.044)
TRTD*(1,2)
yrs before
-0.010
(0.027)
TRTD*(0,1,2)
yrs after*M
0.058
(0.070)
TRTD*(3,4,5)
yrs after*M
0.073
(0.084)
TRTD*(1,2)
yrs before*M
0.047
(0.061)
TRTD*(0,1,2)
yrs after*F
-0.104**
(0.050)
TRTD*(3,4,5)
yrs after*F
-0.064
(0.062)
TRTD*(1,2)
yrs before*F
-0.037
(0.035)
TRTD* (0) yrs
after
-0.034 -0.041
(0.037) (0.044)
TRTD*(1) yrs
after
-0.058 -0.065
(0.041) (0.048)
TRTD*(2) yrs
after
-0.047 -0.054
(0.043) (0.051)
TRTD*(3) yrs
after
-0.014 -0.021
(0.048) (0.055)
TRTD* (0) yrs
after*F
-0.075* -0.088*
(0.044) (0.051)
TRTD*(1) yrs
after*F
-0.117** -0.130**
(0.047) (0.055)
TRTD*(2) yrs
after*F
-0.083 -0.095
(0.050) (0.058)
TRTD*(3) yrs
after *F
-0.051 -0.064
(0.056) (0.062)
TRTD* yrs af-
ter *M
0.053 0.058
(0.061) (0.073)
TRTD*(1) yrs
after *M
0.067 0.072
(0.065) (0.076)
TRTD*(2) yrs
after *M
0.036 0.041
(0.070) (0.080)
TRTD*(3) yrs
after *M
0.068 0.073
(0.076) (0.084)
TRTD*(1) yrs
before
-0.021
(0.031)
TRTD*(2) yrs
before
0.001
(0.029)
TRTD*(2) yrs
before *F
-0.026
(0.038)
TRTD*(1) yrs
before *F
-0.049
(0.039)
TRTD*(2) yrs
before *M
0.057
(0.064)
TRTD*(1) yrs
before *M
0.038
(0.066)
Observations 3,373 3,373 2,707 2,707 1,986 1,986 2,707 2,707 2,707 2,707 2,707 2,707
R-squared 0.060 0.063 0.062 0.066 0.060 0.065 0.063 0.067 0.063 0.066 0.063 0.067
F-stat 2.697 2.775 2.702 2.898 1.854 2.080 2.669 2.790 2.625 2.738 2.532 2.550
R2 0.0597 0.0626 0.0624 0.0658 0.0605 0.0650 0.0626 0.0669 0.0627 0.0663 0.0628 0.0672
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by individuals: *significant at * 10, ** 5, *** 1 percent. a Sample restricted to 4 yrs
after and before the event, b Sample restricted to 3 yrs after and before the event, c Sample restricted to 2 yrs after and before the event.
34
Table 11: Results from Difference in Difference Estimates on separated samples of females
and males respondents
Table 10A - Female Respondents Only
Dependent Variable: Support Incumbent (1)a (2)b (3)c (4)b (5)b (6)b
Treated 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.019 0.019
(0.047) (0.050) (0.053) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053)
After*Treated -0.074 -0.089** -0.097**
(0.047) (0.045) (0.041)
Treated*(1) year before spouse death -0.023
(0.035)
Treated*(2) years before spouse death -0.000
(0.033)
Treated* year of spouse death -0.081* -0.089*
(0.046) (0.052)
Treated*(1) year after spouse death -0.123** -0.131**
(0.049) (0.057)
Treated*(2) years after spouse death -0.088* -0.096
(0.052) (0.060)
Treated*(3) years after spouse death -0.059 -0.067
(0.058) (0.066)
Treated*(1,2) years before spouse death -0.012
(0.031)
Treated*(0,1,2) years after spouse death -0.105**
(0.052)
Treated*(3) years after spouse death -0.067
(0.065)
Observations 2,240 1,797 1,317 1,797 1,797 1,797
R-squared 0.083 0.090 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091
Table 10B - Male Respondents Only
Dependent Variable: Support Incumbent (1)a (2)b (3)c (4)b (5)b (6)b
Treated 0.042 0.086 0.118 0.086 0.096 0.096
(0.067) (0.069) (0.074) (0.069) (0.078) (0.078)
After*Treated -0.021
(0.066)
Treated*(1) year before spouse death -0.009
(0.058)
Treated*(2) years before spouse death 0.069 0.059
(0.065) (0.083)
Treated* year of spouse death 0.069 0.059
(0.073) (0.089)
Treated*(1) year after spouse death 0.033 0.023
(0.077) (0.091)
Treated*(2) years after spouse death 0.047 0.037
(0.086) (0.101)
Treated*(3) years after spouse death 0.102 0.056 0.019
(0.072) (0.066) (0.060)
Treated*(1,2) years before spouse death -0.015
(0.057)
Treated*(0,1,2) years after spouse death 0.048
(0.082)
Treated*(3) years after spouse death 0.037
(0.101)
Observations 1,133 910 669 910 910 910
R-squared 0.086 0.107 0.120 0.107 0.107 0.107
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by individuals: *significant at * 10, ** 5, *** 1 percent. a Sample
restricted to 4 yrs after and before the event, b Sample restricted to 3 yrs after and before the event, c Sample
restricted to 2 yrs after and before the event.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Effect of Widowhood on SWB
To support the validity of our empirical strategy, we show in this section that widowhood
actually constitute a negative shock to life satisfaction, measured by self reported subjec-
tive wellbeing. Using our matched sample, we run a diff-in-diff model for comparing the
effect widowhood had on the life satisfaction of the individivuals who did experience the
shock to the effect it would have had on the counterfactual group. Our final sample is
made out of 229 treated respondents, i.e. whose spouse died between 1992 and 2008 (127
of these are women and 82 men) and of 229 control respondents, i.e. whose spouse did
not die (141 women and 69 men) but who share the same ex ante probability as treated
individuals of experiencing widowhood between 1992 and 2008.
The study by Clark et al. (2008) shows that it persists significantly for a year after
the event (but only for women) and that it is fully reabsorbed after four years. Figure
4 clearly shows the impact of experiencing widowhood on self reported life satisfaction.
From the top graph, we see how reported life satisfaction starts decreasing in the two years
preceeding the death of the spouse, reaches its lowest peak during the year of the spouse
death and then fastly readjusts toward the average level during the two years following
the loss of the spouse. The bottom graphs of figure 4 show that this trend is lead by
female widows, as already noticed by CLark et al. (2008). To see it works in the same
way also for our dataset we estimate the following model:
Wellbeingit = α+σ1× treatedi +σ2× afterit× treatedi +σ3× afterit + γ×Xit + δt +uit
The coefficient of interest is σ2, which is the effect of widowhood on wellbeing for
those individuals whose spouse died. We estimates several variations of this model, which
include interacting treatedi both with the sex of the respondents as well as with dummies
indicating the number of year after the event, {year of the death}, {1, 2, ..4, 5 years after},
{0-2, 3-5 years after}.
The results for this exercise are reported in Table A1. Overall, in line with previous
research, the shock of unhappiness is only significant for women, and it is reabsorbed after
two years from the event. There is no evidence of significant different level of wellbeing
between the treated and the control group after three years from the event. Graph A1
visualise these results.
36
Figure 4: Effect of Widowhood on Life Satisfaction
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Table 12: Results from Difference in Difference Estimates of Widohood on Life Satisfac-
tion
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated -0.193 -0.198 -0.060 -0.067 -0.091 -0.068
(0.120) (0.120) (0.126) (0.126) (0.154) (0.126)
After*Treated*Female -0.283**
(0.123)
After*Treated*Male 0.108
(0.158)
After*Treated -0.164
(0.110)
Treated*(3,4,5) years after spouse death -0.090
(0.127)
Treated*(1,2) year after spouse death -0.480***
(0.127)
Treated*(0,1,2) years after spouse death*Male -0.121
(0.178)
Treated*(3,4,5) years after spouse death*Male 0.114
(0.199)
Treated*(0,1,2) years after spouse death*Female -0.639***
(0.147)
Treated*(3,4,5) years after spouse death*Female -0.177
(0.138)
Treated* (0) year of spouse death -0.693***
(0.196)
Treated*(1) year after spouse death -0.530***
(0.173)
Treated*(2) year after spouse death -0.501***
(0.171)
Treated*(3) year after spouse death -0.006
(0.175)
Treated*(4) year after spouse death -0.287*
(0.159)
Treated*(5) year after spouse death -0.008
(0.180)
Treated* (0) year of spouse death*Female -0.773***
(0.187)
Treated*(1) year after spouse death*Female -0.590***
(0.160)
Treated*(2) year after spouse death* Female -0.551***
(0.163)
Treated*(3) year after spouse death*Female -0.082
(0.165)
Treated*(4) year after spouse death* Female -0.352**
(0.149)
Treated*(5) year after spouse death*Female -0.078
(0.164)
Treated* year of spouse death*Male -0.094
(0.211)
Treated*(1) year after spouse death*Male -0.227
(0.207)
Treated*(2) year after spouse death* Male -0.028
(0.223)
Treated*(3) year after spouse death*Male 0.067
(0.212)
Treated*(4) year after spouse death* Male 0.093
(0.225)
Treated*(5) year after spouse death*Male 0.205
(0.248)
Observations 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 2,143 3,212
R-squared 0.113 0.116 0.121 0.125 0.146 0.126
R2 0.113 0.116 0.121 0.125 0.146 0.126
Note: the sample used is restricted to 5 years before and after the event. Robust standard errors, clustered at
individual level, in parentheses. *significant at * 10, ** 5, *** 1 percent.
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